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JOHN M. NOMIKOS

Combating Illegal Immigration, Terrorism, and Organized Crime in Greece and Italy

During the 1990s the immigration problem in Greece began having explosive dimensions due to not only political and economic developments in southeastern Europe, but also to continuing conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. An important factor which played a relevant role in shaping these developments was the 1991 collapse of Ramiz Alia's regime in Albania and the subsequent flow of illegal immigrants into Greece from Albania and other Balkan states (mainly Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia—FYROM) due to the political unrest that took place in the region during that period.¹

Italy also was affected by this episode—the first “mass migration”—that was solved through bilateral agreements. In Italy, the foreigners' immigration phenomenon reached important numbers at the end of the 1970s due to the country's “open door” policy, exacerbated by the

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restrictive policies adopted by other European countries. The most recent important migratory flux occurred with the “Arab Spring.” According to the Italian Ministry of Interior, in the first nine months of 2011, 60,656 non-European Union (EU) immigrants, particularly from Libya and Tunisia, arrived in Italy by sea—51,596 of whom landed in the Pelagic islands—a huge estimate when compared to the 80,000 arrivals of the previous ten years. On Lampedusa island alone—the nearest to the African continent—on 13 and 14 August 2011, some 2,000 migrants arrived in an area having a local population of 5,000. This was not an isolated episode.²

In both Greece and Italy, the national immigration policy today faces a bureaucratic inflexibility that functions in a fragmentary way and makes no substantial effort toward solving the problem. Dealing with illegal migration as a national security threat is a strategic option. The formation of national immigration policies which will prevent the flow of illegal immigrants is absolutely necessary, as is giving directions in regard to the integration of legal immigrants into both Greek and Italian societies in coordination with the European Union’s Immigration Policy.

The European Commission must pay attention to the strategic added value of the human intelligence (HUMINT) component in the European Immigration Liaison Officers (ILO) Network. The officers need intelligence to help prevent illegal immigration instead of trying to manage immigrants after they have already entered the European Union’s member states.

LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES

After the fall of Europe’s Communist regimes, a mass influx to Greece and Italy of illegal immigrants took place, mostly from neighboring countries. The influx consisted not only of ethnic Greeks from those countries, but also of Albanians, Bulgarians, and other Eastern Europeans. The later wave of illegal immigrants—from the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa—increased considerably in recent years, now constituting about half the annual inflow to Greece. Contrary to popular belief and to journalistic spin, the other half still originates from Albania.³

The census of 1991 indicated that some 10,260,000 inhabitants lived in Greece. A decade later, by March 2001, the population had increased to 10,964,020, of whom 797,091 were foreign citizens. Among the foreigners, 47,000 were citizens of European Union member states living in Greece.⁴

According to the latest official data, Greece’s immigrant population is about 1,150,000, 300,000 of whom are ethnic Greeks from neighboring Albania and the former Soviet Union. This leaves about 850,000 non-Greek immigrants, 600,000 of whom have a residence permit achieved through consecutive regularizations. Notably, though, recent unofficial

estimates indicate that 140,000 regularized immigrants cannot meet the criteria for the renewal of their current residency permits.⁵

In Italy, according to the report of the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), as of 1 January 2011, 4,570,317 foreigners were living there, within an overall population of 60,626,442. Some 425,000 new immigrants arrived in 2010, an increase of 4.4 percent over 2009—and the arrivals continue to increase. Migrants to Italy are mainly from Romania (an EU country), Albania, Morocco, Popular Republic of China (Taiwan), and Ukraine. Other non-EU immigrants come principally from the Philippines, Moldova, India, Tunisia, Peru, Ecuador, Egypt, Macedonia, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.⁶

The immigration policies implemented by Greece and Italy have been mainly repressive and based upon restrictive measures aimed at restricting the flow of illegal immigrants at the respective national borders, but with different results. The Greek and Italian states must study the past and current situations, note the weaknesses of their legal frameworks, and design realistic and sustainable long term immigration policies because the problems of immigration—legal and illegal—will become more visible in the coming decades, with serious repercussions on national security and employment in Greece, Italy, and other EU countries, especially of those overlooking the Mediterranean basin.

Athens Meets the Issue

As to the legal framework, the first law dealing with the issue of foreigners living in Greece was enacted in 1929 (Law 4319/1929). It lasted until 1991 when it was replaced by Law 1975/1991, according to which residence permits were given only to foreigners who had labor contracts.⁷ During the following years, the number of immigrants flowing illegally into Greece increased rapidly due to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the resulting social, economic, and political unrest in the rest of the Balkans. In a peculiar way, this situation led to the relaxation of the deportation policy regarding immigrants living in Greece and who were coming from Balkan states.

Since 1991, Presidential Decrees (PD 358/1997 and 359/1997) led to not only that relaxation but also to the first program of legalizing the illegals which was implemented in 1998.⁸ Moreover, the new Law 2910/2001 replaced the word “deportation” contained in the previous laws with “legalization” and other measures.⁹ Then Law 2910/2001 introduced the concept of family reunification as part of the process of permanent residence in Greece.¹⁰

Unfortunately, implementation of Law 2910/2001, instead of setting goals which would strictly mark out the battle against illegal immigration,

inaugurated a practice of legalizing illegal immigrants with the fewest possible preconditions required of them. This led in subsequent years to the increased flow of illegal immigrants, especially from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Thus any potential illegal immigrant must ask why not go to Greece when the prospect of acceptance, integration, and permanent residence in that country is so easy.

More Recent Legislation

In 2005, a new statute, Law 3386/2005, emphasized the concept of integration and hinted at a policy of integration of illegal immigrants in Greek society. A National Committee for the Social Integration of Immigrants (Law 3536/2007) was created under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. The National Committee issued a Report regarding developments related to the social integration of immigrants at the national and international levels. The Report submitted to the Greek Parliament included policy recommendations regarding the necessary measures to be taken in facing the problem.¹¹

The legal framework of the Greek immigration policy leaves open several questions that can be answered only by officers of the Greek police who deal operationally with the problems of illegal immigration. One officer who desired anonymity responded to several questions, such as: "Why did the huge and massive flow of immigrants in Greece bring great difficulty in implementing Law 1975/1991?"¹² and What are the difficulties? The answers to these questions indicated that illegal immigrants are overtaxing the capacity of the detention cells of law enforcement agencies, both the Police and Coast Guard.

The overcrowding occurs because in many cases the deportation procedures (depending on an immigrant's nationality and country of origin) are taking a very long time. The procedure involves the identification of illegal immigrants who, most of the time, possess no document validating their identity. At this point, Greek authorities must contact the diplomatic missions of the countries to which the immigrants declare that they belong in order to obtain the travel documents needed for completion of the deportation procedure. Problems also arise when the declared country of the arrested individual does not recognize the illegal immigrant as its citizen. In most cases, the problems escalate when the country declared by the illegal immigrant is not represented by a diplomatic mission in Athens (e.g., the Republic of Mauritius). As a result of this bureaucratic dead end, illegal immigrants are detained illegally for months in the detention cells of law enforcement agencies, with serious consequences for their health and humane conditions. What usually happens is that illegal immigrants who come from countries that are not represented diplomatically

in Athens are released and ordered to leave Greece within 30 days (Law 1975/1991) at their own expense.

Many questions remain to be answered regarding the laws that are currently being implemented. How many illegal immigrants will actually leave Greece? What happens if they will not leave? What rules apply if they are involved in illegal commercial activities or criminal activities? What will the implementation of the Dublin II readmission agreements mean for the social cohesion of Greek society?

SIMILARITIES ABOUND

The Italian situation resembles that of Greece, even though Rome's anti-illegal immigration laws have been increasingly repressive and restrictive. The first, Law 39/1990 ("Martelli"), defined and widened the legal status of refugee and the related right of political asylum while, simultaneously, attempting to regulate the influx of immigration during the 1980s by allowing the entrance to the country of only a small percentage of non-EU immigrants, based on Italy's productivity and occupational needs.

Due to rapid changes in immigration patterns, however, the law soon showed its inadequacy, and a more exhaustive law was approved by Parliament. Law 40/1998 ("Turco-Napolitano") was then merged into Legislative Decree 286/1998, the Single Act on norms concerning the regulation of immigration and foreigners' status.

Four years later, this 1998 law was modified by Law 189/2002 ("Bossi-Fini"). The main mechanism adopted for containing immigration is the "fluxes policy," through which the government establishes by decree, year by year, the number of foreigners who can enter Italy for employment reasons. The law also introduced some restrictions to the entrance of citizens coming from countries that do not adequately cooperate with the Italian government in tackling illegal migration or in readmitting their own citizens who have to be repatriated, while granting preferential quota to those states having bilateral agreements that regulate migratory fluxes and readmission procedures. Law 189/2002 also tightened detention and monetary penalties for aiding and abetting illegal immigration and reformed the procedures of expulsion. Indeed, while the earlier "Turco-Napolitano" law highlighted the administrative aspect of repatriation by honoring an intention to leave the country, leaving compulsory deportation as a residual, the "Bossi-Fini" Law advanced forced deportation as the main mechanism of control. As in Greece, the newly-created Temporary Detention Centers play a relevant role since every illegal alien must remain in these facilities before being repatriated. The law also introduced preventive measures, including the implementation of cross-border controls.¹³

The Bossi-Fini Law was subsequently modified by other acts, among them Law 125/2008, which envisaged an expulsion measure for EU member states' citizens condemned to a detention penalty longer than two years; Law 94/2009, which criminalized illegal entry and staying, and Law 129/2011, that foresaw the possibility of keeping irregular non-EU immigrants in a Center for Identification and Expulsion (CIE) for up to eighteen months.

REPERCUSSIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION, TERRORISM, AND ORGANIZED CRIME

In the last decade, Greece has become the recipient of an indefinite number of illegal immigrants from Asian and African countries. Half the illegal immigrants arrested by the Greek police are Albanians. But, most of the illegals are entering Greece mainly through the Greek-Turkish border with the tolerance or even the assistance of Turkish state authorities, regardless of the bilateral agreements that have been signed on this matter since 2003.¹⁴

Notably, though, many immigrants who enter Greece illegally prefer to seek asylum in another European Union member state and use Greece as only a passage point to other European states. Therefore, the Dublin II arrangement has proven to be rather insufficient for two main reasons: (1) while Dublin II apparently sets the bases for regulating a rather chaotic phenomenon, in fact it constitutes a convenient way for EU member states that are not on the front line of the illegal immigration to deal with the problem. As a consequence, asylum seekers having passed through Greece are transferred back to Greece, which in 2010 undertook the heavy burden of coping with 90 percent of all illegal immigrants entering the European Union, and (2) a flaw of the Dublin II arrangement is the fact that it does not take into consideration that no equivalent standards and practices for the protection of asylum seekers prevail in EU member states. In fact, Greece has one of the lowest refugee recognition rates. For instance, in 2009, from a total of 29,501 applications that were examined, only 0.04 percent were accepted.¹⁵ This situation has resulted in a conflict and national security threat that seems to be impending over Greece.

In May 2010, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan officially visited Greece, and Michalis Chrisochoidis, the Greek Minister of Citizen Protection, and Besir Atalay, the Turkish Minister of Interior, agreed to take all the necessary measures to ensure full and effective implementation of the provisions of the bilateral Readmission Protocol in force in order to combat illegal immigration.¹⁶ Turkey agreed to accept a minimum of 1,000 requests for readmission every year. In the effort to combat illegal immigration, Turkey noted that the participation of other states in the broader region is necessary.

The Ongoing Threat to Stability

As a consequence, illegal immigration is actually an asymmetrical threat that destabilizes the Greek state. Of special importance is the study of the causes Turkey's violation of the Readmission Protocol for illegal immigrants that was signed with Greece. Turkish authorities are not complying with the terms of the Protocol, and are not cooperating on issues of readmission. Thus, they are creating many problems, particularly during the procedures of surrender of the illegal immigrants on the borders with Greece. Turkish governments are effectively implementing the "Ozal Doctrine" which effectively states "We do not need to make war with Greece. We need to send them a few million illegal immigrants from Turkey and finish with them."¹⁷ The uncontrolled flow of illegal immigrants poses multiple dangers to Greece's national security because: (a) it can destabilize social cohesion through demographic denaturation; and (b) it encourages the spread of organized crime and terrorist networks. An illegal immigrant, a high level operative of al-Qaeda, passed the Greek border and was arrested by the Greek authorities after he tried to receive political asylum with forged documents.¹⁸

Moreover, the U.S. State Department has published a report on human rights and terrorism in which Greece is referred as the first entrance point to the Schengen zone from its south and east borders (which are also the borders of the European Union), and that its extensive coastline presents the danger that terrorists will bypass its patrolled borders.¹⁹ The uncontrollable influx and settlement of very large numbers of illegal immigrants into Greece's major cities has resulted in the creation of "no-go areas" and ghettos, especially in Athens's city center. Not surprisingly, criminality is rife and ethnic clashes and riots are commonplace in these areas. Another symptom of Greece's flawed immigration policy is the very significant contribution of foreigners in such serious crimes as homicides, robberies, thefts and burglaries, and rapes. This "contribution" ranges from 33 percent for homicides to 51 percent for thefts and burglaries (according to arrest data for 2009).²⁰ Albanians, being by far the largest immigrant ethnic community, are responsible for a significant part of the imported criminality. According to a recent police report, 42 criminal organizations from Albania operate in Greece.²¹ As a result, illegal immigration to Greece exploded in 2010. (See Table 1.) And in 2011 the number of illegal immigrants arrested had also increased. (See Table 2.)

Some Contrasts

Although Greece has been neither a colonial power nor asked for a larger workforce, it has received an uncontrollable number of illegal immigrants in a short period of time. Absorbing the vast majority of these immigrants

Table 1. Illegal Immigrants Arrested (2010)

Greek–Albanian Borders: 33,979
Greek–Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia: 1,589
Greek–Bulgarian Borders: 983
Greek–Turkish Borders (Evros River): 47,088
Greek–Turkish Sea Borders (via Greek islands): 6,204
Crete Island: 2,444
Rest of Greece: 40,237
Total: 132,524

Source: Greek Police and Ministry of Citizen Protection Data (2010).

Table 2. Illegal Immigrants Arrested (per citizenship) by the Greek Police and Coast Guard (2011)

Citizenship	Arrested by the Police (2011)	Arrested by the Coast Guard (2011)	Total
Afghanistan	28,269	259	28,528
Pakistan	19,975	0	19,975
Albania	11,731	2	11,733
Bangladesh	5,416	0	5,416
Algeria	5,398	0	5,398
Marocco	3,404	1	3,405
Iraq	2,838	25	2,863
Somalia	2,234	4	2,238
Palestine	1,980	85	2,065
Congo	1,855	0	1,855
Syria	1,439	83	1,522
Eritrea	1,167	5	1,172
Tunisia	1,095	0	1,095
Egypt	757	238	995
Iran	941	18	959
India	950	0	950
Georgia	879	0	879
Ivory Coast	822	0	822
Senegal	733	0	733
Nigeria	661	0	661
Others			6,104
Total			99,368

Source: Greek Police and Ministry of Citizen Protection Data (2011).

by Greek society is extremely difficult due to ethnic, cultural, and religious reasons.

Greek governments must now finally understand that the time in which the issue of illegal immigration could be “solved” by arid discussion and confrontations between politicians has long passed. The intensity of the phenomenon is “*ante-portas*,” judging from the over-population of many Asian and African countries, along with the current Greek financial crisis. This situation is creating an even greater tension in the Greek border areas. Athens must declare to the European Union and the international community that it can no longer serve as the ideal geographical area through which illegal immigrants seek to pass in order to reach other, perhaps more attractive, destinations.

As for Italy, official statistics indicate that, as against an increment of about the 500 percent in the number of residence permits granted from 1990 to today, the criminality rate has remained almost unchanged, and even in the regions with a higher rate of immigration, no augmentation of the rate of criminality has occurred.²² Moreover, two-thirds of the foreigners who work honestly have passed through the Caudine Forks of an illegal status.²³ An interesting study carried out on the Romanian community shows how the legalization of all Romanian citizens residing in Italy after the entrance of Romania into the European Union on 1 January 2007 drastically reduced the recidivism in the ten months following the pardon of 1 August 2006, when compared with those who came from other countries and have not been regularized. This overrepresentation in jails of irregular immigrants seems to be due to their illegality rather than to their status as immigrants.²⁴

Meeting Threats to Italy

But this doesn't mean that immigration to Italy does not represent a threat to its public and national security, particularly when considering the involvement of terrorist and organized crime groups. According to a report released by the Italian Intelligence System, the intelligence provided by the country's intelligence agencies supported the implementation of stringent law-enforcement operations aimed at dismantling organized crime groups dedicated to illegal immigration, falsification of identity documents, and other illegal activities. Among them was Operation “*Cestia*,” which dismantled a criminal circuit composed of Afghan citizens aimed at facilitating the transfer of illegal migrants from Asia to Europe, and Operation “*Scutum*” that combated a network of foreigners from Pakistan, North Africa, and Syria who were financing terrorist organizations in their countries through the proceeds accumulated in Italy through these illegal activities.²⁵

The link between illegal migration and terrorism was clearly demonstrated by a Turkish Hizballah terrorist cell that was smashed in February 2012 by police in the cities of Terni, Modena, Milan, and Rome. Those arrested were accused of aiding and abetting illegal immigration. Indeed, the organization had transferred to Italy Kurds and Palestinian migrants, providing them with accommodations, jobs at one of the several kebab shops managed by the terrorist organization, along with forged documents to allow them to ask for political asylum and then obtain a residency permit.²⁶ The possibility of such entry to the EU countries of potential terrorists hidden among those requesting asylum for political or humanitarian reasons was foreseen in the Europol report of April 2011.²⁷

Facilitating Terrorism

Several investigations carried out on Italian territory demonstrated how illegal immigration—through the connivance of transnational organized crime groups—contributes to the financing of terrorist organizations and to the exfiltration of their militants from conflict zones. In particular, some investigations have confirmed the presence of cells composed primarily of overstayers who are members of transnational terrorist organizations, whose task—perhaps secondarily—was to facilitate illegal immigration. In 2009, for example, two illegal immigrants from Tunisia were deported. They had filed for international protection, but were wanted by the authorities in their country because of past involvement in Jihadi-Salafi organizations. In another important example, in September 2008, an arrested Algerian citizen had been previously reported, along with a fellow countryman, by Algerian authorities to be a supporter of “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM). These examples easily lead to suspicion of the existence of a sophisticated method of illegal immigration that could be exploited by jihadists by taking advantage of the complicity of criminal organizations involved in the smuggling of migrants.²⁸

In addition, migratory fluxes—particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa—were more recently fueled by the riots in Libya against the former Ghaddafi regime as a retaliation towards Europe, and especially Italy, with which Ghaddafi signed, on 29 December 2007, an agreement for a joint patrolling of the Mediterranean sea against illegal migration. Also, the 2011 riots in Tunisia and Egypt fueled migrations toward Italian coasts. In order to deal with this emergency, on 5 April 2011, Italy signed an agreement with the government of Tunisia, followed by repatriations, which considerably reduced the flow. But other migrants continued to come from Asia: particularly from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and China—passing through Greece and Turkey, while another route, through the Balkans, is used

especially by Eastern Europe criminal groups who exploited the vulnerabilities of police controls in the Black Sea area.²⁹

IMMIGRATION INTELLIGENCE LIAISON OFFICERS (ILO) AND THE JOINT SITUATION CENTER IN THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS)

The EEAS, a European Union department established by the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, was formally launched on 1 December 2010. The EEAS functions as a foreign ministry and diplomatic corps for European Union member states, implementing the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and other elements of the EU's external representation.³⁰ The EEAS manages the EU's response to crises, has the Joint Situation Centre as an EU intelligence body, and functions under the authority of the EU's High Representative, who is in turn directed by its director, Baroness Catherine Ashton.³¹

The Joint Situation Centre (JSC or SitCen) was established in 2002. As Mai'a K. Davis Cross has pointed out,

the Center monitors and assesses events and situations world-wide on a 24-hour basis with a focus on potential crisis regions, terrorism and WMD proliferation. The most sensitive information is still shared through informal channels among smaller groups of EU member states with a history of trust and past experience sharing sensitive information.³²

In the EU member states immigration is presented as resulting in social problems since it tends to disturb the social cohesion of a state. The dilemmas that need to be addressed include: How can the EEAS update the role of the Joint Situation Centre in cooperating efficiently with the EU's member states facing the issue of illegal immigration whose seemingly uncontrollable dimensions can lead to explosive social unrest? Are European Union Immigration Liaison Officers needed to conduct human intelligence (HUMINT) operations in the EU border areas? And should they possess, as well as analyze, the information at the Joint Situation Center in order to combat illegal immigration and create a Common European Union Immigration Policy (CEUIP)?

In dealing with these dilemmas, the European Commission took certain necessary measures during the European Council of Seville in June 2002, asking for the creation of a "network of European Immigration Liaison Officers (ILO) from the EU member states before the end of 2002."³³ Moreover, the European Council of Thessalonica in June 2003 referred to the strategic importance of intelligence to be provided by the ILO network, and for the "development of a mechanism that will assess the relations

with non-EU countries (mainly Asiatic and African countries) that are not cooperating with the EU in combating illegal immigration.”³⁴

Under the authority of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Immigration Liaison Officers (ILO) will have as their central objective the collection and sharing of intelligence among the EU’s Joint Situation Centre and the EU member states in order to make the European Union’s borders safer. Furthermore, EUROPOL (the European Police Agency) will be kept informed by the Immigration Liaison Officers.³⁵ The ILO’s HUMINT intelligence collection network will focus mainly on:

- a. The flow of illegal immigrants through a receptor country and the routes that groups of illegal immigrants are following in order to reach territories of other EU member states;
- b. The means (transportation, participation of intermediaries) that illegal immigrants are using to reach other member states;
- c. The existence and operations of criminal organizations that are aiding and abetting the smuggling of migrants;
- d. The measures and means that the European Commission is using to prevent the flow of illegal immigrants through its member countries;
- e. The means of facilitating the outflow of illegal immigrants from their countries of origin;
- f. Intelligence (HUMINT) that is communicated from the ILO database through the Rapid Alert System (RAS).

Moreover, the EEAS, in cooperation with FRONTEX, is to provide the necessary operational support to the ILO network in combating the uncontrollable and explosive problem of illegal immigration and transnational crime in order to allow the EU member states to collaborate and share strategic intelligence that will enable them to prevent or significantly limit the future inflow of illegal immigrants to their countries.³⁶ The ILO network is the base for the fulfillment of the Common European Union Immigration Policy since the European Commission is to clarify the kinds of skills needed by legal immigrants. At this point, Greece and Italy must give preference to evaluating competent officers who will be able to rapidly coordinate the undertaking of operational activities for combating illegal immigration and transnational crime with the least amount of bureaucratic inflexibility.

MEETING THE CHALLENGE

Envisaging every security problem as a threat to national security results in over-expanding its scope, eventually diminishing and scattering the intelligence efforts that are then diverted from other tasks of demonstrated greater relevance for the protection of national interests. Overall, migration in itself is not a matter of national security but rather of public security.

But the latest migration flows clearly deserve the attention of national intelligence agencies when certain particular conditions occur: (1) where irregular immigration is concerned; (2) when it happens on a grand scale; (3) when it occurs as a result of conflict situations; (4) when it occurs in a time of economic recession; and (5) when it involves groups of people from countries with a social and cultural background different from the receiving society, resulting in problems of social cohesion.

The European Commission, in order to efficiently and operationally confront the problem of uncontrolled illegal immigration, has established a network of Immigration Liaison Officers. But the ILO should focus on effective HUMINT in order to prevent the traffickers in illegal immigrants from bringing them into European territory, and not limit itself to dealing with the problem after the illegal immigrants are already in European territory.

Reactive measures are simply no longer feasible in face of mass migrations. Thus, preventive strategies must be developed and implemented by each EU member state within the framework of the new Common European Union Immigration Policy. Member states should shift their efforts from law-enforcement repression operations to intelligence-led preventive activities. These, however, depend on development and maintenance of a strong political and coordinated will at both the national and EU levels.

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- ⁷ Law 1975 (12 April 1991) clarifies explicitly the Police responsibility for controlling the borders (Article 3, Paragraph 4), the entrance of immigrants (Article 6), the stay of immigrants (Articles 12, 13, 14), work permits of

- immigrants (Articles 21, 22, 23), and restrictions and deportation procedures (Articles 26, 27, 28, 29).
- ⁸ Presidential Decree (P.D. 358/97), “Prerequisite and procedures for the legitimate stay and work of foreigners who are not citizens of EU member-states,” and Presidential Decree (P.D. 359/97), “Issue of residence card of limited duration for foreigners.”
- ⁹ The Law was enacted in 2001 (Law 2910) “Entrance and Stay of Foreigners in Greek territory, legitimization and other measures.”
- ¹⁰ Article 3 of Law 3386/2005 refers to the process of social dialogue in order to shape policies which are promoting the integration of immigrants in all spheres of society according to International Law and the European Vest.
- ¹¹ Law 3536/2007 refers to the foundation of the National Committee for the Integration of Immigrants in the Greek Ministry of Interior. Articles 3 and 4 refer to the general prerequisites for the renewal of the residency permit of immigrants.
- ¹² On 30 November 2008, a Greek police officer (who wishes to remain anonymous) with experience on immigration issues spoke with us about the practical problems that the Greek police face with illegal immigrants and the difficulties they encounter in implementing the laws for combating illegal immigration.
- ¹³ Erika Gramaglia, “La schizofrenia dell’accoglienza.” *Legge Martelli, Turco-Napolitano, Bossi-Fini: la legislazione dell’immigrazione*, Paginauno n. 8, June–September 2008 (Italian only) at http://www.rivistapaginauno.it/la_schizofrenia_dell'accoglienza.php
- ¹⁴ Since 2003, Greece has been implementing the Dublin II regulations, according to which the responsibility for handling illegal immigrants in the European Union belongs to the country through which they first entered. Actually, in Europe whenever an illegal immigrant (who has passed through Greece) is arrested, he or she is returned to Greece which has become a Reception Center for illegal immigrants. But on 15 July 2010, Greece’s Deputy Minister attended a European Union Ministerial Council of Justice and Interior Ministers meeting in Brussels on “how to achieve a common European Asylum System until 2010.” There, he asked for a temporary postponement in implementation of the Dublin II regulation in Greece. http://www.yptp.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=3239&Itemid=441&lang, Press Release, Ministry of Citizen Protection, 15 July 2010, Athens, Greece.
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- ¹⁹ “The slaps are . . .,” *To Paron* (Greek Newspaper), 15 March 2009. The “Schengen zone” constitutes those EU member states that do not require passports from their citizens to travel within their territory.
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³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ The European Police Agency (EUROPOL), founded in July 1995, started operating on 1 October 1998. Though EUROPOL is responsible for combating crime and terrorism, it is not a European Police. An institutional body in the service of EU member-states, it assists them in dealing more efficiently with criminal activities.

³⁶ Founded on 26 October 2004, FRONTEX is the European Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the EU member states. In addition to its intelligence-driven activities, FRONTEX provides particular added value to the national border management systems of the EU member states.